HM _Mahaas, SOMALIA – The strategic town of Mahaas, which was held continuously by government forces for over twelve years, fell to Al-Shabab this morning following a calculated counter-offensive that exploited the security vacuum created by Mogadishu’s political warfare against federal member states. The loss of Mahaas, coming as federal forces are airlifted to Gedo to confront Jubaland’s administration rather than extremists, represents the wholesale collapse of the much-heralded 2022 uprising against Al-Shabab in eastern Hiran—a collapse accelerated by the Federal Government’s systematic prioritization of political control over security imperatives.
The fall of this historically significant town, which had weathered Al-Shabab’s previous incarnations and survived the militant group’s territorial apex, to a relatively modest force demonstrates how profoundly federal political warfare has degraded Somalia’s security architecture. Local sources report that Al-Shabab’s recapture involved minimal resistance, as demoralized government forces, stripped of reinforcements diverted to political operations and abandoned by a federal leadership more interested in confronting Jubaland than extremists, simply melted away in the face of militants who offered local communities the peace deals that Mogadishu could not.
This morning’s events in Mahaas represent the nadir of a security strategy that has transformed from counter-terrorism to counter-federalism, from fighting extremists to fighting regional administrations that maintain the only effective governance in Somalia. As federal aircraft ferry troops to intimidate Ahmed Madobe’s democratically elected administration in Gedo, as resources flow to SSC-Khatumo’s territorial claims against Puntland, and as the Somali National Army hemorrhages territory across southern Somalia, the question no longer remains whether the Federal Government can defeat Al-Shabab but whether it has become the militant group’s most effective ally through its systematic undermining of every functioning security arrangement in the country.
The Strategic Significance of Mahaas
Mahaas occupies a unique position in Somalia’s security geography, sitting at the intersection of crucial supply routes that connect eastern Hiran to both government-controlled territories and Al-Shabab strongholds. Its twelve-year resistance to militant control, through the Ethiopian intervention, AMISOM/ATMIS operations, and the various iterations of Somali governmental authority, made it a symbol of resilience and a practical demonstration that sustained government presence could prevent extremist encroachment even in contested territories.
Local security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity as they fled the advancing militants, described how Mahaas served as an early warning system for Al-Shabab movements, a coordination point for regional security operations, and a demonstration effect that government authority could persist even in challenging environments. Its fall eliminates these capabilities while handing Al-Shabab control over critical infrastructure and population centers.
The timing of Mahaas’s collapse proves particularly devastating given its role in the 2022 anti-Al-Shabab uprising that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud initially hailed as a turning point in the war against extremism. The town had served as a logistics hub for the Macawisley militia operations, a safe haven for community leaders organizing resistance, and proof that local populations would support government authority when given credible alternatives to extremist rule. That this symbol of resistance has fallen to government abandonment and community exhaustion speaks to the profound demoralization that federal political warfare has inflicted on Somalia’s security efforts.
Al-Shabab’s Political Warfare Succeeds Where Federal Governance Fails
Al-Shabab has been systematically negotiating peace agreements with communities in eastern Hiran, a sophisticated evolution in the group’s strategy that exploits the governance vacuum created by federal political preoccupations. These agreements, which local sources describe as offering security guarantees, reduced taxation, and conflict resolution mechanisms in exchange for acceptance of Al-Shabab authority, provide what exhausted communities desperately need: predictability and protection from the chaos of competing authorities.
The content of these peace deals, as reported by community members who participated in negotiations, reveals Al-Shabab’s growing political sophistication. Rather than imposing harsh rule immediately, the group offers graduated implementation of their governance system, and exemptions for certain cultural practices. This flexibility, born from lessons learned during previous territorial control, contrasts sharply with the Federal Government’s rigid insistence on unconditional submission to authorities that provide neither security nor services.
This dynamic inverts every assumption underlying international support for Somalia’s federal structure. When Al-Shabab becomes the actor providing stability and the Federal Government becomes the force generating chaos, communities make rational choices for survival that happen to align with extremist expansion. The tragedy lies not in these communities’ choices but in the federal abandonment that makes such choices necessary.
The SSC-Khatumo Distraction
While Al-Shabab consolidates its gains in southern Somalia, the Federal Government continues pouring resources into SSC-Khatumo’s efforts to claim portions of Puntland territory. The weapons, funds, and political support flowing to SSC-Khatumo represent resources directly diverted from the fight against extremism, creating a zero-sum dynamic where every federal effort to undermine Puntland translates into operational advantages for terrorist groups.
The federal support for SSC-Khatumo’s territorial ambitions has forced Puntland to maintain significant military deployments along its internal borders, reducing forces available for operations in the Al-Miskad and Cal Madow mountains where Al-Shabab and ISIS-Somalia maintain strongholds. I
The strategic incoherence of supporting SSC-Khatumo while losing to Al-Shabab reflects deeper pathologies in federal decision-making. No rational security assessment would prioritize creating new conflicts in stable regions over resolving existential threats in contested areas. No professional military doctrine endorses opening multiple fronts while losing on the primary battlefield. No sustainable governance model attacks its own successful components while failing in core responsibilities. Yet these principles, obvious to any observer, seem to escape a federal leadership consumed by political calculations.
The Unraveling of the 2022 Uprising
The fall of Mahaas marks the definitive end of illusions about the 2022 anti-Al-Shabab uprising in Hiran and Middle Shabelle, an initiative that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud had proclaimed as a new model for community-led security operations. Launched with great fanfare in June 2022, the uprising initially showed promise as local Macawisley militias, supported by federal forces and energized by community grievances against Al-Shabab’s harsh taxation, reclaimed significant territory including strategic towns and rural districts.
The uprising’s initial success stemmed from genuine popular mobilization against extremist excesses, competent military coordination between local and federal forces, and sustained political attention that provided resources and legitimacy. Communities that had suffered under Al-Shabab’s draconian rule saw opportunities for liberation and contributed fighters, intelligence, and logistical support. International partners, encouraged by organic Somali resistance to extremism, provided additional assistance that enabled rapid territorial gains.
However, the federal leadership’s subsequent actions systematically undermined every element that made the uprising successful. Political attention shifted from supporting liberated communities to confronting regional administrations. Military resources were diverted from consolidating gains to political operations. Promises of development and governance in liberated areas evaporated as federal focus moved to constitutional manipulation and term extension schemes. Most damagingly, the community militias that formed the uprising’s backbone found themselves abandoned—unpaid, unequipped, and increasingly vulnerable to Al-Shabab’s inevitable counter-offensive
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